{
  "slug": "aes-gcm-siv",
  "term": "AES-GCM-SIV",
  "aliases": [
    "AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV",
    "AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV"
  ],
  "definition": "AES-GCM-SIV is an authenticated-encryption construction that limits the damage from accidental nonce reuse using a synthetic initialization vector.",
  "note": "RFC 8452 specifies 128- and 256-bit keys, a 96-bit nonce and a 128-bit tag. POLYVAL authenticates plaintext and associated data before counter-mode encryption. Message keys depend on the master key and nonce, so repeating the nonce repeats those derived keys. [rfc8452] [key-derive]\n\nWith the same key, nonce and associated data, identical plaintext produces identical ciphertext. Misuse resistance does not promise unlimited reuse: the specification recommends random nonces, with security bounds depending on repetition, message count and length. [rfc8452]\n\nIn the linked native-library example, altered ciphertext and a changed expected version are rejected, but an old ciphertext still decrypts with its old context. Rejecting a rolled-back version requires an independently trusted freshness policy, not merely an authenticated version field stored beside the data. [example] [rfc5116]\n\nDecryption computes candidate plaintext but must not release it until authentication succeeds. Ciphertext includes a 16-byte tag, so its length limit exceeds the plaintext limit. The example's 1 MiB payload cap is a resource limit, not a cryptographic usage bound. [rfc8452] [guide]\n\nRejecting wrong keys in tests is not a proof of key commitment. That property resists a ciphertext valid under different keys. Nonce misuse resistance does not imply it: the 2021 result of Len et al. is untargeted and cannot precisely choose the colliding key set, not a recovery of arbitrary random secret keys. [rfc9771] [len2021] Albertini et al. describe a separate construction for two known keys. [albertini2022]",
  "status": "shipping",
  "advantages": [],
  "limitations": [
    {
      "text": "Encryption needs two passes over the message; it cannot emit ciphertext before processing the complete plaintext.",
      "citationIds": [
        "rfc8452"
      ]
    },
    {
      "text": "Successful vector tests do not prove security bounds or establish a safe storage protocol.",
      "citationIds": [
        "guide"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "related": [
    "cryptographic-nonce",
    "authenticated-encryption",
    "key-commitment"
  ],
  "supersedes": [],
  "supersededBy": [],
  "firstSeen": null,
  "lastSeen": null,
  "updated": "2026-11-22",
  "citations": [
    {
      "id": "rfc8452",
      "title": "RFC 8452: AES-GCM-SIV, sections 4-6 and 9, Appendices B-C",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8452.html",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "key-derive",
      "title": "Gueron and Lindell. Better Bounds for Block Cipher Modes of Operation via Nonce-Based Key Derivation. CCS 2017, section 6.",
      "url": "https://acmccs.github.io/papers/p1019-gueronA.pdf",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "rfc5116",
      "title": "RFC 5116: AEAD scope and the separation of anti-replay services, section 1.2",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5116.html#section-1.2",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "example",
      "title": "Hesela: native-library nonce, context and replay observations with public test inputs",
      "url": "https://hesela.dev/research/nonce-siv/observations.json",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "code",
      "title": "Hesela: bounded AES-GCM-SIV and AES-GCM demonstration using Node/OpenSSL",
      "url": "https://hesela.dev/research/nonce-siv/demo.mjs",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "tests",
      "title": "Hesela: reference-vector, corruption, context and malformed-input tests",
      "url": "https://hesela.dev/research/nonce-siv/demo.test.mjs",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "vectors",
      "title": "RFC 8452 Appendix C: extracted numeric test vectors with source digest",
      "url": "https://hesela.dev/research/nonce-siv/vectors.json",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "guide",
      "title": "Hesela: reproduction instructions and limits of the demonstration",
      "url": "https://hesela.dev/research/nonce-siv/README.txt",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "rfc9771",
      "title": "RFC 9771: key commitment and its distinction from full commitment, section 4.3.3",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9771.html#section-4.3.3",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "len2021",
      "title": "Len, Grubbs and Ristenpart: Partitioning Oracle Attacks, USENIX Security 2021, section 3.2",
      "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-len.pdf",
      "accessed": "2026-11-21"
    },
    {
      "id": "albertini2022",
      "title": "Albertini et al.: How to Abuse and Fix Authenticated Encryption Without Key Commitment. USENIX Security 2022, section 3.4.1.",
      "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec22-albertini.pdf",
      "accessed": "2026-11-22"
    }
  ],
  "provenance": [
    "RFC 8452 is an Informational CFRG specification, distinct from the earlier GCM-SIV paper and AES-SIV in RFC 5297. [rfc8452]",
    "The CCS 2017 paper supplies a concrete cryptographic analysis, not a storage-fleet experiment. Its historical performance figures are not repeated as current benchmarks. [key-derive]",
    "The example runs established library primitives with synthetic public inputs; it is not a new cryptographic implementation or proof. [example]"
  ]
}
