byzantine-failure · also Byzantine fault, arbitrary failure

Byzantine failure

A Byzantine failure permits a component to deviate arbitrarily from its specified behavior, including sending conflicting information to different participants.

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The model describes behavior, not intent: defects and malicious actions can both cause arbitrary deviations. Equivocation means conflicting statements about the same protocol decision; it is not a synonym for all Byzantine failures. [1] [3]

Authentication identifies an origin, not truth. A faulty replica can sign conflicting statements using its own key. PBFT's basic client accepts matching authenticated replies from f + 1 distinct replicas for the same request, with at most f faulty replicas. [1] [3]

PBFT's 3f + 1 configuration is model-specific. Safety and liveness have different assumptions; liveness depends on communication timing. Consistent execution cannot make an authorized client's bad write useful, and a faulty replica may disclose information. A missing reply alone does not establish a Byzantine fault. [2]

Signed-message agreement can use a different fault bound. SM(m) assumes reliable delivery, detectable message absence and unforgeable signatures. Signature forwarding exposes conflicting orders; signatures alone do not supply the timing assumptions. This synchronous agreement result is not a replacement replica count for PBFT. [4]

Relations

related
Fault model, Consensus, Quorum intersection

Limitations

  • A Byzantine-fault-tolerant protocol's guarantees depend on its stated faulty-replica bound, authentication and progress assumptions; the term itself does not certify a deployment. [1, 2]

Citations

  1. Castro and Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. OSDI 1999, section 2: System Model. (accessed 2026-11-20)
  2. Castro and Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. OSDI 1999, section 3: Service Properties. (accessed 2026-11-20)
  3. Castro and Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. OSDI 1999, sections 4.1-4.4: client replies, normal operation and view changes. (accessed 2026-11-20)
  4. Lamport, Shostak and Pease. The Byzantine Generals Problem. TOPLAS 4(3), 382-401, 1982; sections 3, 4 and 6. (accessed 2026-11-20)

Further reading

  1. Hesela. Storage timeouts: a signed reply can still be wrong. (accessed 2026-11-20)
Sources & caveats
  • Primary-source synthesis of a failure-model concept; not a new consensus protocol, cluster experiment or estimate of failure frequency.

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Hesela team. Byzantine failure. Hesela. 2026-11-20. https://hesela.dev/terms/byzantine-failure/